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  We examine the relationship between welfare state policies and economic 
performance in a small open economy with (i) free trade in final goods and 
international capital mobility, and (ii) aggregate increasing returns to scale. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that a retrenchment of welfare 
programmes is not an inevitable consequence of economic integration. Instead, 
by improving the exploitation of aggregate scale economies, social expenditure 
policies and international openness complement each other in facilitating an 
improvement in economic performance that can sustain a more generous 
welfare protection. 
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1.    Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the contentious question of the compatibility 
between welfare state and globalisation which, despite its colossal policy importance, is still 
fairly unexplored at the theoretical level.  In the last two decades, welfare state policies have 
come increasingly under attack by an emerging consensus that sees them as being inimical to 
economic growth and incompatible with successful participation in a highly integrated world 
economy.  Two major arguments characterise this conventional wisdom: (i) the distortionary 
effects of redistribution policies and the taxation necessary to finance them translate into high 
firms’ costs – this is the argument developed, for instance, by Alesina and Perotti (1997); and 
(ii) the revenue raising capacity of governments is hindered by increasing economic 
integration, thus making it more difficult for them to finance these policies.  From a 
normative point of view, the main implication of this view is the inevitability of welfare state 
retrenchment.  However, despite the rhetorical calls for change (which have not been limited 
to centre-right governments), there is very little evidence that the increased extent of goods 
and capital market integration during the last few decades has contributed systematically to 
the rolling back of mature welfare states, and reforms have generally been limited to a 
restructuring of expenditure.
1  Furthermore, empirical evidence exists that points to a positive 
relationship between welfare state and openness (Rodrik, 1998) and welfare state and 
competitiveness (De Grauwe and Polan, 2005). 
  In this paper we develop a theoretical model which shows that international openness 
does not inevitably reduce the revenue raising ability of governments; instead, openness can 
complement welfare state policies in improving economic performance and enhancing 
welfare.  At the core of our argument lie the imperfectly competitive nature of markets and 
the fact that in a second best world economic policy can be used to correct the effects of 
market imperfections.
2  Within a model characterised by imperfect competition in the labour 
market (in the form of unionisation) and in good markets (with a monopolistically 
competitive intermediate sector), we show that social security programmes can lead to higher 
levels of economic efficiency by improving the exploitation of potential aggregate scale 
                                                           
1  Despite wide cross-country variations in spending levels, social expenditure in OECD countries, with the 
exception of Norway, has increased up to the mid-1990s and whilst some areas of social protection have 
modestly declined, others have enjoyed stability or even a slow growth (European Commission, 2002).   
2  The macroeconomics literature has devoted comparatively little attention to welfare states and redistribution 
policies and has mostly shown how conventional tax-and-spend policies can reduce inefficiencies stemming 
from market imperfections − e.g., Devereux et al. (2000).  Amongst the exceptions, van der Ploeg (2003) 
examines the effects of social policy on employment and growth and shows that conditional unemployment 
benefits may spur job creation.     2
economies.
3  This channel is particularly relevant in mature industrial countries where 
unprecedented depths of the division of labour have resulted in highly complex economic 
systems and production externalities. We argue that the acknowledgment of these 
externalities – whose effects on the economy may not be easily predictable – is essential for 
any meaningful debate about the sustainability of social expenditure and welfare state 
programmes.  Our findings challenge the view that free trade and capital mobility undermine 
governments’ ability to pursue income redistribution policies.  We show that, by enhancing 
the exploitation of aggregate scale economies, a more generous welfare state increases 
overall welfare regardless of the tax instrument used to finance the policy, even when the 
policy is financed through an increase in capital taxation that may initially stimulate a capital 
outflow.  The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model, Section 
3 describes the general equilibrium and carries out the policy analysis, and Section 4 draws 
some conclusions.   
2. The  Model 
We focus on a small open industrial country characterised by free international trade and 
capital mobility, and a government that uses distortionary taxation to pursue an income 
redistribution policy.  The small-open-economy assumption is especially interesting because 
international economic integration is commonly purported as reducing countries’ monopoly 
power in world markets and governments’ ability to retain control over national policies.   
  To portray a typical advanced industrial economy, we assume that labour markets are 
unionised and that the production structure is characterised by inter-sectoral linkages that 
give rise to aggregate economies of scale.  It is now widely accepted that a typical 
implication of industrial development is the increasing complexity and ‘indirectness’ of 
production processes, with final goods sectors relying progressively more on highly 
specialised intermediate inputs.
4  We thus assume an input-output structure with one 
upstream monopolistically competitive industry and two downstream perfectly competitive 
                                                           
3 In Acemouglu and Shimer (2000), unemployment insurance improves allocative efficiency by enabling 
workers to pursue riskier and more productive options.  In De Grauwe and Polan (2005), social expenditure 
affects workers’ productivity by entering directly the production function of the private sector.  In our model, 
the effects of government policy on aggregate efficiency emerge endogenously and do not result from an a 
priori link between social transfers and productivity. 
4   Existing empirical evidence reveals that important inter-industry connections exist and lead to external 
returns to scale in manufacturing, e.g. Caballero and Lyons (1992) and Bartelsman, et al (1994).  The 
theoretical importance of vertical linkages as a source of economy-wide increasing returns to scale has been 
widely acknowledged, e.g. Eithier (1982), Matsuyama (1995), and Venables (1996).     3
sectors producing two homogenous final goods, whose quantities we denote by  1 Y  and  2 Y .  
The output of the upstream industry comes in a continuum of horizontally differentiated 
varieties  () ,[ 0 , ] i x iN ∈  that can be thought of as consisting of highly specialised producer 
services and other intangible inputs such as knowledge. The larger is the mass of 
intermediates N, the higher will be the degree of specialisation in production and the resulting 
aggregate efficiency.  Thus, to the extent that government policies influence market structure 
and the availability of the upstream varieties, they will also affect aggregate productivity, the 
economy’s trade performance and the direction of international capital flows.   
2.1.  Consumers and welfare 
The population of consumers is divided into a mass L  of individuals who form the labour 
force and a mass R  of agents outside the labour force.  The latter are either retired or are 
below the working age.  Each individual in L  is endowed with one unit of labour which it 
supplies inelastically if employed.  The employed (L) receive wages while the unemployed 
() LL −  and those in R  receive a benefit transfer income from the government.  
  Only final goods are consumed and the utility function of the representative consumer 
is 













 ,  (1) 
where  h y  is the quantity of good h=1,2 consumed,   1 0 < < µ , V
~
 is the utility of leisure, and 
1 = ξ  if the individual is employed and  0 = ξ  otherwise.  For each consumer, demand 
functions for the two final goods are derived by choosing  h y  to maximise (1) subject to the 
budget constraint that equates expenditure  11 22 Py Py +  with income ( h P , h=1,2, denotes the 






























h Y  denotes the quantity of good h=1,2 demanded and M is the nominal disposable 
aggregate income (to be defined later).     4
  The aggregate welfare, measured by the indirect utility, is obtained by substituting (2) 
back into (1), namely, 
  () L L R V
P
M
U − + + =
~
,  (3) 
where 
µ µ − =
1
2 1 P P P  is the consumer price index and  () L L R − +  is the measure of consumers 
who do not work and receive the benefit transfer from the government.  
2.2. Producers 
There are three primary inputs in the economy.  We call these labour (L), land (Z), and capital 
(K), whose rates of return are respectively denoted by w, q and r.  Whilst labour and land are 
internationally immobile, capital is allowed to flow freely in and out of the country.  We shall 
treat K as physical capital, but the results of the analysis would not be qualitatively affected if 
K were interpreted as human capital  − embodied in skilled labour − instead.   
  The two homogenous consumer goods produced by the downstream industries,  1 Y  and 
2 Y , are assumed to be freely traded in world markets.  We shall label these as ‘high-tech’ and 
‘low-tech’ respectively and assume that labour is not directly required as a primary factor in 
their production; both goods are produced using capital, land and a CES basket of 
intermediate inputs, X.  For a given set of intermediates, both final goods are produced with a 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology, 
h h h
h h h h h X Z K A Y
λ β α = , where  1 0 < < h α , 
1 0 < < h β ,  h h h β α λ − − =1 >0 and we use the normalisation 
h h h
h h h h A
λ β α λ β α
− − − = , for h=1,2.  
It is plausible to assume that the high-tech good ( 1 Y ) is relatively more intensive in the 
intermediates and at least as intensive in capital as the low-tech good ( 2 Y ), which is instead 














< ≤ < .    (4) 
  The intermediate input, assumed to be non-traded
5, consists of a mass N  of 
horizontally differentiated varieties that are assembled into a CES composite input  
                                                           
5  The non-tradability of intermediates is commonly assumed in the literature to capture the importance of 
geographical proximity of the intermediate sector to final good industries, e.g. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and 
Rodrik (1996).  Note, however, that in the presence of inter-sectoral linkages, this assumption does not imply 



















i di x X ,   (5) 
where xi is the quantity of a typical variety i and σ is the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties.  We assume σ >1 so that no single variety is an essential input per se.  This CES 
technology implies that there are increasing returns to the range of available varieties, since 
the productivity of the intermediate basket rises with N.   The price index for the intermediate 


















i x di p P ,    (6) 
where  i p  is the price of intermediate variety i.  
  Given the downstream sectors’ production technology, the minimum total cost of 
producing Yh is 
  ( )
h h h
x h h P q r Y C
λ β α = ,         h=1,2.  (7) 
Since these two industries are perfectly competitive, their production levels are determined 
by the equality between price and marginal cost,  
 
h h h
x h P q r P
λ β α = ,         h=1,2.    (8) 
The small open economy and free trade assumptions imply that  h P  are determined in world 
markets.   
  The input demands by the two final good industries can be obtained by applying 
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Sheppard’s Lemma can also be used to obtain, from (7), a system of demand equations for 
the varieties of the intermediate input used by the two final good industries.  Given (6), these 














X X x 2 1 .    (10) 
  The intermediate input varieties are produced by an endogenously determined (via 
free-entry and exit) mass of identical firms.  Labour is the only factor of production 
(reflecting the existence of sector specificity of factors), and is used as both fixed and 
variable input.  The labour requirement of a typical firm i is   
  γ δ + = i i x l ,   (11) 
where  i l  is the labour required to produce output  i x  and δ >0 and γ >0 are the marginal and 
fixed input coefficients, assumed to be the same across firms.  The existence of a fixed 
production cost, by giving rise to internal increasing returns to scale and to an incentive to 
specialisation, ensures the one-to-one correspondence between the mass of firms and that of 
available varieties.  The firm’s profit thus is  
  i i i i i l w x p − = π ,   (12) 
where  i w  is the wage rate it pays its workforce.  Taking  i w  as given and choosing  i p  to 
maximise (12) subject to (10) and (11), it can be shown that the optimal price rule for a 
typical firm i is  i i w p δ σ σ )] 1 /( [ − = .  Using, for simplicity, the normalisation  δ σ σ = − / ) 1 ( , 
we write this price setting rule as  
  i i w p = . (13) 
  In the free-entry equilibrium, each firm will break even.  Substituting from (11) and 
(13) into (12) and setting the resulting equation equal to zero, we obtain the equilibrium 
output scale of a typical firm in the intermediate good industry,  
  i x σγ = .   (14) 
The constant elasticity of substitution assumption and the lack of strategic interaction 
between firms imply that the optimal output scale – and the extent to which each firm 
exploits internal increasing returns to scale – is constant.  Hence, changes in market size do 
not affect the mark-up and the size of firms but only the size of the product range N.   
2.3. Factor  markets 
Markets for land and capital are assumed to be perfectly competitive and factor prices q and r 
adjust to satisfy the respective market clearing resource constraint,    7
  
d d Z Z Z 2 1 + = , (15) 
 
d d K K K K 2 1
* + = + , (16) 
where Z and  K  are  the economy’s endowments of these factors.  With capital mobility, the 
stock of available capital can differ from the country’s endowment by an amount 
* K  that 
denotes the capital inflow or outflow.  Assuming perfect substitutability and full mobility of 
capital, arbitrage in the international capital market ensures that the capital flow ceases when 
the parity condition,   
  () ( )
* * 1 1 r r ρ ρ − = − , (17) 
is attained.  The left-hand-side of (17) is the net of tax domestic return on capital and the 
right-hand-side is the (exogenous and net) foreign return.   
  The labour market in the intermediate sector is unionised, with unions having 
monopoly over wages and firms determining employment levels.  For simplicity, we assume 
that unions are firm specific and a typical union i embraces the workers of, and sets the wage 
rate for, firm i.  Unionisation implies that involuntary unemployment persists in equilibrium 
and that each union will have some unemployed members, hence () 0 ii ll −> , where  i l  and  i l  
are the union’s employed and total members respectively.  Each union is assumed to 
maximise the expected utility of its typical member subject to its labour demand.  Hence, 



























,  (18) 
where τ and b are respectively the labour income tax rate and the unemployment benefit 
payment.  The latter, which we assume not to be taxed, is a net transfer.  The union will 
choose wi to maximise (18) recognising that  i l  is determined by the firm but is affected by its 
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 ,        (19) 
where  i ε  is the wage elasticity of labour demand facing a typical union and provides an   8











εσ ≡− = − . (20) 
  As equation (19) shows, the real net-of-tax wage results from a mark-up on the 
union's ‘reservation wage’ () / bPV +  , where the mark-up factor  /( 1) ii εε −  is negatively 
related to the labour demand elasticity  i ε , and thus is increasing in union’s monopoly power.  
Also, the optimal real wage set by the union is positively related to both the labour income 
tax rate and the real value of unemployment benefit payment, since: (i) a ceteris paribus 
increase in τ  reduces the after tax wage; and (ii) a higher real benefit rate b/P reduces the 
utility difference between being employed and unemployed.      
2.4.  Government budget constraint, national income and balance of payment 
The government provides welfare protection in the form of net transfer to those who do not 
receive wage from employment.  This is financed through the taxation of primary factors’ 
income.  We use the source principle as the tax rule, so that income generated by the inflow 
of capital is taxed before it is repatriated.  Noting that  i
i
Ll d i =∫  and  i
i
Ll d i =∫ , and assuming 
that the government pays the same lump-sum benefit b to all individuals who do not receive 
income from employment, the government budget constraint is  
 
* () ( ) ii
i
bR L L w ld i rK K q Z τρ φ +− = + + + ∫ , 
where φ and ρ  are, respectively, the land and capital income tax rates.  Given the symmetry 
across both firms and unions, this yields  
  Z q K K r wL L L R b φ ρ τ + + + = − + ) ( ) (
* . (21) 
 Aggregate  income  (M) is determined by total returns to primary factors and transfers 
                                                           
6  Given the small open economy and free trade assumptions, P1 and P2 are fixed at world prices and hence P is 
exogenous. Thus, fixing b in nominal terms does not affect the analysis that follows. We follow the literature 
in assuming that unemployed workers from other unions cannot be employed in a given union’s firm before 
the latter’s unemployed members are hired.  Also, in maximising their objective function, each union takes 
the mass of firms and the government policy variables as given; although this is equivalent to assuming that 
entry into the industry and the government’s choice of policy instruments occur prior to unions’ setting of 
wages, the fact that all agents in the economy are insignificantly small individually to interact strategically, 
implies that no strategic complication arises in terms of the sequence of the moves. Hence, the results would 
not change if we assumed there to be a fixed (but sufficiently large) number of identical unions as in Alesina 
and Perotti (1997).    9
between the public and private sectors which can be written as follows 
  ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) M R L L b wL rK qZ τρ φ =+ − + − + − + − .    (22) 
It is worth noting that, using (21) and (22), M is simply the sum of primary factors’ gross 
income, i.e., 
* rK Z q K r wL M ρ + + + = , where the last term on the right-hand-side reflects 
the taxation of income accrued to mobile capital.   
  Finally, the balance of payments equation sets the value of net exports to zero and is 
given by  
 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
*
2 2 2 1 1 1 = − − − + − rK Y Y P Y Y P
d S d S ρ . (23)   
3.  General Equilibrium and the Effects of Welfare Policies 
Table A.1 in the Appendix gives the general equilibrium equations of the model that 
determine the 11 endogenous variables, q, r, w, Px, X, N, L, K
*, M, U and one of the tax rates 
τ, ρ, or φ which the government will use to balance its budget.  In this section we use the 
model to study the consequences of a move to a more generous welfare system by starting 
from an initial equilibrium and analysing the impact of a rise in b on the endogenous 
variables.  Before doing so, however, it is useful to highlight the main characteristics of the 
model.   
  Let us assume, for simplicity, that φ is the endogenous tax rate.  Equations (A1)-(A3) 
imply that r, q and Px are ultimately determined regardless of the rest of the model.  It then 
follows from equations (A4) and (A5) that, as long as σ exceeds unity and is finite, a higher 
wage rate is associated with a larger mass of firms and a higher level of aggregate 
employment.  This positive relationship between the wage rate and the number of firms and 
employment is not intuitively obvious and critically rests on the existence of increasing 
returns to the range of available intermediates which renders the equilibrium mass of 
varieties (and firms) suboptimal
7; a rise in wage in such circumstances contributes to 
correcting the effects of the market imperfection.   
  To appreciate this point let us examine the effects of a rise in w when b is kept 
constant so that there are no immediate consequences for the ‘expenditure’ side of the 
government budget constraint.  Such a wage rise can be induced, for example, by an 
                                                           
7 Matsuyama (1995) explains how such suboptimalities emerge when markets are monopolistically 
competitive.  For a further discussion of the nature of the suboptimality that arises in the above context see 
Molana and Montagna (2005).   10
exogenous rise in the utility of leisure, V  , as unions mark up on () / bPV +  .  For a given N, 
the exogenous rise in w will imply a higher disposable income which, by stimulating final 
goods’ consumption, will result in a higher demand for all factors of production, X, K and Z.  
The higher demand for capital will exert an upward pressure on r that will result in a capital 
inflow until the parity condition is restored.  The larger capital stock will in turn increase the 
marginal product of the other factors used in both downstream industries, thus further 
boosting the demand for X.  The increase in the demand for X will foster entry into the 
upstream sector and result in a deeper division of labour within the economy, i.e., a rise in 
both N and L.
8   
  Following the expansion in the range of intermediates, Px will fall reducing average 
production costs in both downstream industries.  Given that final goods’ prices Ph are 
predetermined and the sectors are perfectly competitive, this will generate new demand for 
inputs implying further entry of firms in the upstream industry and of capital into the country.  
In sum, the original wage shock will result in a virtuous circular causation process of rising 
demand for intermediates, entry of new firms into the upstream sector, and higher aggregate 
efficiency that will amount to an increase in the level of economic activity, i.e. higher 
employment in the upstream sector and higher output of intermediates and final goods.  It is 
straightforward to show that this expansion will result in a higher aggregate income and 
welfare.  In this context, therefore, there is clearly a strong motive for the government to 
induce a wage rise as long as the financing consequences of the policy do not crowd out its 
positive effects.   
  The aim of the remainder of this section is to examine the effects of an expansionary 
welfare policy shock, i.e., a rise in b, when the government uses each of τ or ρ to balance its 
budget.  To carry out the policy analysis, it will prove useful to reduce the model in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix to two equations and two unknowns, w and either τ or ρ.  We obtain 
these equations from the unions’ wage setting rule and the government budget constraint.
9  
The graphs of these equations in the (w,τ ) space − or, in the (w,ρ) space − can then be used 
                                                           
8  For a given N, the increase in w will initially result in a rise in the upstream sector’s marginal production cost 
and prices.  As a result, Px will initially rise, leading – in both final good sectors – to a substitution away from 
X and towards K and Z, hence exerting an upward pressure on these factor prices that will reinforce the 
inflow of capital.  It is tedious but straightforward to show that although this first effect will partially offset 
the increase in the demand for X and the ensuing rise in N, it will not dominate, i.e., the net effect of the 
policy will be to increase the demand for X, leading to entry into the sector.   
9  In terms of the equations in Table A.1 in the appendix, we solve (A1)-(A7) for q, r, Px, N, L, X and K
* and 
substitute the solution into (A8) and (A9).    11
to analyse the determination of the general equilibrium values of  w and τ − or w and ρ.    
  Figure 1 sketches the graphs of the two equations when the government uses τ to 








The line labelled UU depicts the unions’ wage setting rule − obtained from (A8); the 
government budget constraint − obtained from (A9) − is shown by the line labelled GG.  The 
intuition underlying the slopes of these lines is straightforward.  The UU is upward sloping 
because, starting from any point on the line, an increase in τ  will rise unions’ wage demand; 
the horizontal arrows in Figure 1 indicate the direction in which the wage rate will move 
above and below the UU.  The GG slopes downward because a higher w enables the 
government to reduce τ , given the existence of a positive relationship between w and L 
determined in the rest of the economy (i.e. excluding unions’ action and the government 
budget constraint); the vertical arrows indicate the direction in which the tax rate will move 
above and below the GG.  The equilibrium therefore will be stable as long as the GG is flatter 
than the UU, so that starting from any arbitrary initial point, such as A, the economy 
converges to E, as shown in Figure 1.  When the tax rate ρ is used as the instrument to 
balance the government budget, the UU will be vertical in the (w,ρ) space since ρ does not 
                                                           
10  We have verified the uniqueness of equilibrium numerically for plausible values of the relevant parameters. It 
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feature in (A8).  Figure 2 illustrates the situation.  In this case the equilibrium will always be 
stable since, starting from any arbitrary initial point such as A, the economy will move 
towards the UU and then converge to point E along it, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 –  Equilibrium when  ρ  or φ  is used as instrument 
 
 
  The analysis of the effects of a rise in the welfare payment, b, can now be 
carried out by examining how the two lines shift and, hence, the equilibrium values of w and 
τ (or w and ρ) change as b rises.  Given the complexity of the algebra involved, we do not 
provide, in the paper, the analytical expressions for the equilibrium solutions that occur at the 
intersection of the two lines and instead present in Figures 3 and 4 below the numerically 
simulated versions of the UU and the GG curves.
11  The solid lines depict an initial situation 
and the broken lines show the effect of a rise in b.  Figure 3 corresponds to the case in which 
the government uses τ  to balance its budget.  The rise in b shifts the UU to the right because, 
for any given τ, it induces unions to set a higher wage rate.  It also shifts the GG up since, for 
any given w, a higher τ is needed to balance the budget.  The broken lines correspond to a 5% 
rise in b and their intersection shows that in the new equilibrium w is higher and τ is lower. 
Figure 4 depicts the case in which the government uses ρ to balance its budget.  Again, the 
broken lines show the effect of a 5% rise in b and their intersection implies that w rises and ρ 
falls in the new equilibrium.  Thus, in both cases, the increase in b  – by triggering the 
virtuous circle of higher wages, entry into the intermediate sector and higher income – leads 
                                                           
11  See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the initial values used in all numerical analysis. We have verified that the 
results are robust qualitatively for a plausible numerical range of the parameters involved. 
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to a reduction in the tax rate.  In the latter case, the reduction in the tax rate also stimulates a 
larger capital inflow. 
 Figure 3 – Effect of a 5% rise in b financed by τ 
 
Figure 4 – Effect of a 5% rise in b financed by ρ 
 
 
To summarise, our results show that despite free trade and capital mobility, and 
regardless of the tax instrument used, an increase in the generosity of the welfare state 
typically leads to a higher welfare.  By increasing the upstream sector’s wage, a higher 
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welfare protection deepens the division of labour within the economy and raises both 
aggregate income and the extent to which the country specialises in the high-tech sector.
12  
When the government finances the policy by taxing immobile factors, this virtuous circle is 
unambiguously reinforced by a capital inflow that increases the demand for the intermediate 
good and may strengthen the shift of resources towards the high-tech good – to the extent that 
the latter is more intensive in the use of capital.  The use of capital taxation to finance the 
policy shock does not substantially alter the above results, but strengthens the virtuous circle 
triggered by the policy by reducing the tax rate on capital.  On the whole, these results cast 
doubt on the conventional wisdom according to which openness and in particular capital 
mobility − by leading to a ‘shrinking tax base’ − hinders the use of redistribution policies. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper has examined the role of economy-wide increasing returns to scale in shaping the 
relationship between welfare state policies and economic performance in a small open 
economy with free trade in final goods and international capital mobility.  Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, we find that a retrenchment of welfare programmes is not an inevitable 
consequence of economic integration.  Instead, by improving the exploitation of aggregate 
scale economies, social insurance policies and international openness can complement each 
other in facilitating the provision of a more generous welfare protection.   
  These findings – which are consistent with, and help to explain, the evidence that 
goods and capital markets integration has not led to significant reductions in welfare states 
and tax burdens in OECD countries – crucially rest on the imperfectly competitive nature of 
the labour market and the intermediate sector of the economy.  In the former, unionisation 
results in equilibrium wages being positively related to the unemployment benefit and 
income tax rates.  In the latter, the existence of monopolistic competition leads to the 
emergence of increasing returns to the range of available varieties of the intermediate input.  
As a result, the expansionary effects of higher unemployment benefits and wages trigger a 
virtuous circle of entry in the intermediate sector, greater aggregate productivity, and higher 
income.  This virtuous circle is not weakened by the free mobility of capital. 
  Unions play a crucial role in the transmission mechanism between government 
policies and economic performance: with unionisation, welfare state policies have 
distortionary effects since unions transfer the burden of taxation on to firms via higher wages.  
                                                           
12  Clearly, the expansionary effects of the policy reduce as the economy’s labour resource constraint tightens.     15
We find, however, that even with the high degrees of distortion associated with non-
internalising unions, increases in social protection can have positive effects on aggregate 
welfare.  The reason for this is that unions’ rent-seeking activity contributes, by raising 
income, to the emergence of a virtuous circle that reduces the sub-optimality in the provision 
of intermediate varieties.  This clearly suggests that encompassing unions – typical of 
corporatists industrial relations systems – are not (as is often suggested, e.g., Garrett, 1998) 
necessary to ensure compatibility between welfare states and high degrees of international 
openness, and that production externalities can severely influence the way different labour 
market institutions affect economic performance.   
  It is important to stress, however, that the existence of unionisation is not necessary 
for the above results to emerge.  Any form of labour market imperfection (e.g., efficiency 
wages) that gives rise to a positive link between wages and policy instruments would most 
likely lead to similar conclusions.  Similarly, our conclusions do not crucially depend on the 
specific structure of the model we have used in this paper; it is not difficult to show that the 
fundamental forces at work are not altered when some of the assumptions – such as (i) small-
open-economy, (ii) non-tradability of intermediates, and (iii) absence of unionisation in the 
final good sectors – are relaxed.
13  Finally, it is also true that welfare state policies are not the 
only way by which governments may trigger the virtuous process of cumulative causation 
described above.  One lesson of economic policy is that policy intervention should be applied 
as closely as possible to the desired target.  Thus, given that in this case the market 
imperfection leads to a sub-optimal production of varieties, industrial policy may well be 
more effective in correcting the distortion.  This consideration, however, does not diminish 
the relevance of our analysis whose aim is to question the generality of the existence of a 
conflict between welfare state and economic globalisation.  The welfare state has played a 
specific social and political role in advanced industrial economies and various attempts to 
retrench it are being met by oppositions that could lead to a backlash against trade and capital 
markets liberalisation.  Our concern in this paper has been to assess the extent to which 
openness and this type of policies are incompatible, and our findings suggest that they need 
not be.  
                                                           
13   Molana and Montagna (2005) derive optimal unemployment benefit policy in a two-country model with 
tradable intermediates and unions in final good sectors. Their findings are consistent with those above.     16
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Appendix 
A1.    Derivation of equation (19) and the expression for ε  
The wage setting equation for of union i derived by choosing  i w  to maximise (18).  The first 
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ε ≡− , the 
expression in the square brackets can be rearranged as  () ( ) 0
~
) 1 ( 1 = + + − − V P b w i i i ε τ ε  
whose solution for  i w  yields equation (19).  The expression for  i ε , on the right-hand-side of 
(20), is derived as follows.  Using firms’ labour demand  γ δ + = i i x l  and taking account of 



































































σ , since 
s s d Y P Y P X 2 2 2 1 1 1 λ λ + =  and  x P  are 










.  Finally, 
recalling the normalisation  δ σ σ = − / ) 1 (  and that firms’ optimal output scale − in equation 
(14) − is  i x σγ = , we obtain  1 i εσ =− .  
 
 
A2.    Solving for general equilibrium 
Table A.1 below gives the equations that determine the endogenous variables. Equations 
(A1) to (A9) can be solved for q, r, w, Px, K
*, L, X, N and one of the tax rates − τ, ρ, or φ. 
These solutions can then be substituted into (A10)-(A11) to determine M and U.  The last 
column of the table explains how each equation originates from the model where the numbers 














< ≤ <  by assumption.  The other parameters used in the equations in 
Table A1 are defined as follows:   
 
  21 12 ∆β λβ λ ≡−>0;        () 21 12/ x θα β α β ∆ ≡− <0;     and     () 21 12/ z θα λ α λ ∆ ≡− >0. 
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Table A.1.  Equations of the model 
(1) 
(A1)  () ( )
* * 1 1 r r ρ ρ − = −   (17) 
(A2)  ()
z r P P q
θ λ λ ∆ − − =
1
1 2
2 1   (8) 
(A3)  ()
x r P P Px




− =   (8) 
(A4)  w N Px
σ − = 1
1
  (6), (13) 
(A5)  N L γσ =   (11), (14), ( 1)/ δσ σ =− ,  L = N l 
(A6)  wL X Px =  setting  0 π =  in (12),  x PX Npx =  
(A7)  () ()
* / zx x KK q Z P Xr θθ += −   see explanations below the table 















τ   (19) 
(A9)  ( ) Z q K K r wL L L R b φ ρ τ + + + = − +
* ) ( (21) 
(A10) 
* rK Z q K r wL M ρ + + + =   (22) 
(A11)  () L L R V
P
M
U − + + =
~
  (3) 
(1) We have dropped the subscript i by imposing symmetry across unions and firms. 
Equation (A7) is derived as follows. Using (15), (16) and noting that 
d d X X X 2 1 + = , we 
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Solving the first two equations for 
s Y1  and 
s Y2  yields,  
2 1 1 2
2 2





Z q X P
Y P
x s , and 
2 1 1 2
1 1





X P Z q
Y P
x s .  Substituting these into the third equation yields   
 

















2 1 1 2
2 1 1 2
2 1 1 2
2 1 1 2 *
λ β λ β
β α β α
λ β λ β
λ α λ α
,  
which can be re-written as (A7) using the definitions of  x θ  and  z θ  given above.   21
Table A.2.  Initial and after-shock values of the variables and the associated multipliers
(1) 
 U  M  L  N  X  K









51.39  4839  0.89 3869  512 35795  5211 9.06  0.06  2.35 0.09  610 
IMPLIED 
MULTIPLIER 











  IMPLIED 
ELASTICITY 




51.38  4839  0.89 3868  508 37284  5277 9.18  0.05  2.38 0.07  611 
IMPLIED 
MULTIPLIER 











  IMPLIED 
ELASTICITY 
(5) 
1.39  1.42  0.81 0.81  1.28 2.16 0.87 0.25  -0.66  0.31 -8.49 -0.18 
(1)   The initial values used for parameters and exogenous variables in numerical analysis are: 
**
12 1.5; 1; (1 ) 0.05; 0.5 ; 0.1 / ; o PP r R L V b P ρ == − = = = 953; 0.1; b τφρ == = =   12 1 2 0.0001 ; 2.3; 0.3; 0.2; 0.5, 1. LZ K L γσ α α β β == = = = = = = =    
We have verified that the results are robust qualitatively for a plausible numerical range of the parameters and exogenous variables involved. 
 
(2)   Welfare bill is the total amount transferred by the government,   ) ( L L R b − + .   
(3)   The shock is %∆b=5.  
(4)   The multiplier, for a variable Z, is calculated as ∆Z / ∆b.  
(5)   The elasticity, for a variable Z, is calculated as %∆Z / %∆b.  
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